Some political questions begin not in parliaments or newspapers, but in classrooms.
For me, it began during O-level English, studying Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar. We analysed rhetoric and motive, learned Antony’s speech, weighed Brutus against Cassius. But beneath the literary discussion lay a troubling question:
Was the assassination justified?

Caesar is killed not by foreigners, not by invaders, but by fellow Romans. Senators. Citizens. Men who believe — or convince themselves — that they are acting to save their Republic. Brutus frames it as an act of civic duty: not hatred of Caesar, but love of Rome.
That detail matters.
Caesar is struck down by members of his own political community. The act, however violent, emerges from within Rome itself. It is Romans deciding Rome’s fate.
And yet the result is catastrophic. Civil war. Bloodshed. The end of the Republic. Shakespeare offers no reassurance that internal action guarantees internal salvation. Even when a people act against a perceived tyrant, they may unleash forces they cannot control.
That lesson has echoed through history.
When thinking about Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, it is hard not to imagine that earlier removal might have spared millions. If Germans had succeeded in eliminating Hitler in the 1930s, might Europe have been saved some horror? If Soviet insiders had removed Stalin earlier, might the purges have been curtailed? If Italians had ended Mussolini’s rule sooner, might the damage have been lessened?

These are agonising counterfactuals.
But even here, the Julius Caesar warning remains: removing the individual does not automatically dismantle the structure beneath him. Rome’s instability predated Caesar’s murder. Likewise, Nazism was not only Hitler; Stalinism was not only Stalin.
Still, there is an additional moral layer when we move to modern examples such as Iraq or the ongoing tragedy of Syria.

There, the removal — or attempted removal — of rulers has involved external powers. Other nations deciding that a regime must fall. Other governments determining the political future of a people not their own.
And here the moral terrain becomes even more fraught.
One might argue that a people possess some moral right to resist — even violently — a tyrant who is destroying their nation. That argument has ancient roots. It rests on the idea of political self-determination: that sovereignty ultimately resides in the people themselves.
But when another nation intervenes to remove a ruler, the equation changes. However oppressive the regime, the act is no longer purely one of internal civic decision. It becomes entangled with geopolitics, strategic interest, power projection, unintended consequences.
In Iraq, the removal of Saddam Hussein did not lead to stable democracy. It created a vacuum. Sectarian violence surged. Institutions collapsed. The decision was not made by Iraqis alone; it was shaped and executed by external actors.
In Syria, foreign involvement has deepened and prolonged conflict rather than resolving it.
This is not to romanticise tyranny or deny suffering. It is to recognise that legitimacy matters. Who decides? On what authority? With what mandate? Violence undertaken “for” a people is not the same as violence undertaken “by” that people.
And even then — even if internal — the Roman example stands as warning. Brutus and his fellow conspirators believed they were acting for the Republic. They believed they were preventing tyranny. Instead, they accelerated its transformation into empire.
The moral question, then, is double-edged:
Does a people have the right to remove a tyrant ruining their nation?
Does another nation have that right on their behalf?
And even if the answer to the first is sometimes yes, does it follow that the outcome will be better?
History rarely rewards simple answers.
When I think of Iran — a country with deep intellectual traditions, a young population, internal political currents — I find myself hoping that any change that comes will emerge from within its own civic life. Change rooted internally may still be turbulent. But it carries a legitimacy that externally imposed transformation often lacks.

The schoolboy reading Julius Caesar sensed that something was morally unstable about the conspirators’ certainty. The adult observing modern geopolitics senses something equally unstable about nations deciding the fate of others in the name of liberation.
Brutus killed Caesar to save Rome.
Rome lost its Republic anyway.
That is the enduring caution: violence, even when clothed in civic virtue, does not guarantee freedom. And when violence crosses borders, the moral ground becomes even more uncertain.
It remains a real question. A difficult one. Perhaps one that resists final resolution.
But it is one worth continuing to ask.






















































































































